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Egyptian law allows for arbitration and negotiation if any dispute arises between
Egypt and a foreign nation. Egypt is a signatory in several ‘international
investment agreements’ signed with a host of foreign nations, considering the
fact that foreign investments have a good stake in the region. Not only does the
Egyptian constitution open many channels and protective measures to encourage
foreign investment in the region, but the current laws in Egypt also grant investors
full protection, incentives and less interference from the government. Often it
is criticised that while Egyptian law attracts foreign investments, at the same
time it should take into account the public interest, national laws and domestic
jurisdiction.
This article examines to what extent Egypt’s current investment legal
framework favours domestic interests and how the lopsided Bilateral Investment
Treaties (BITs) signed by Egypt with a number of nations and the adoption of
US-BIT norms show a bias towards the interests of foreign investment entities.
Evidently, most of these BITs contain clauses that have resulted in disputes that
are submitted to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID) for proper settlement. This article scrutinises the arbitration cases filed
before ICSID in respect of investor-state disputes involving Egypt in order to
understand the significance of the BITs in general and the adoption of US-BIT
norms in particular.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, investment laws have been enacted by each successive government
in Egypt to offer legal privileges to foreign investors to boost investments. These
legal privileges included tax exemption, subsidised energy costs and international
disputes settlement. All these incentives indicated that the Egyptian parliament
had passed such investment laws that were consistent with the regime’s policies.
In spite of this there were many lawsuits against Egypt in international arbitration
forums. Though Salacuse opined that the laws of the concerned host country
formed the basis of the legal structure of any investment treaty, there were also
the provisions of the norms of International Investment Agreements (IIAs), and
particularly of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs).1 The principal norms of IIA
and BIT are Free Transfer, Nationalisation and Expropriation, Compensation
for Damages Due to War and Similar Events, Settlement of Disputes between
the Investor and the Host State, Subrogation and Promotion and Protection of
Investments which includes a few sub-norms such as security, equitable treatment
and Most Favoured Nation (MFN) provisions.2
Under these IIAs and BIT norms, the Egyptian investment laws grant several
incentives and guarantees to foreign investors:3 for instance, it grants any foreign
investor, normal or legal person, the right to transfer his income earned in Egypt; to
own projects up to 100 per cent; to enjoy guarantees against confiscation, seizure,
nationalisation and compulsory pricing; to own land; to own bank accounts in a
foreign currency; to enjoy immunity from administrative detention; to repatriate
capital and profits to his country; and finally, not subjected to Egyptian policy
on staff recruitment and equal treatment regardless of nationality. Notably, these
privileges and guarantees are consistent with requirements of the norms of BITs.
The next section discusses the norms of BIT in detail.
II. US-BIT NORMS AND RELEVANT EGYPTIAN LAWS
According to Salacuse, BIT norms are ‘standards of behavior defined in terms of
rights and obligations’. He also asserts that BITs specify standards of ‘treatment’
that host states are obliged to accord to investors and investment from their
treaty partners. This clearly confirms that BITs offer protection to foreign
investors against any political risk resulting from placing their assets under host
country jurisdiction and what the host country must give to investors and their
investments’.4 According to UNCTAD, at the beginning of 2014, the total number
of all investment treaties was 3,236, consisting of 2,902 BITs and 334 other
1 Jeswald Salacuse, The Law of Investment Treaties (Oxford University Press, 2015).
2 David W. Rivkin, ‘The Impact of International Arbitration on the Rule of Law: The 2012 Clayton
Utz/University of Sydney International Arbitration Lecture’, 29 (3) Arbitration International
(2013): 327–60.
3 Official State Information Service of Egypt, Economy, Investment. http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/
Templates/Articles/tmpArticles.aspx?CatID=354#.VytStYQrLIW (accessed 5 May 2016).
4 Salacuse, supra, note 1, p. 46.
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Figure 1. Six ‘core’ norms of US-BITs.
types of international investment agreements.5 Approximately 180 countries had
signed at least one of these agreements with Egypt.6 In framing the Egyptian
investment law, Egypt made use of the six ‘core’ BIT norms of US Bilateral
Investment Treaties7 which are considered to be the six basic benefits to investors
(see Figure 1).8 Each norm is discussed below as found in the US-BIT.
1. The first norm of the US-BITs is the National Treatment (NT) or
Most Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment during the whole life cycle
of investment, i.e. from its establishment or acquisition, through
its management, operation and expansion, until its disposition9 to
be exercised on foreign investors and their ‘covered investments’.
Additionally, the norm also mandates that each foreign investor or
his investment will be treated as favourably as the host party would
treat its own investors and their investments.
2. The second norm establishes a balance on the expropriation of
investments and provides for the payment of prompt, adequate and
effective compensation in the event of expropriation.
5 UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2014 (2014): 114.
6 For a listing of countries that have signed BITs and other investment agreements, see ibid., 222–5.
7 US Department of State, Diplomacy in Action, The US Bilateral Investment Treaty Program,
Bilateral Investment Treaties and Related Agreements, http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/bit/
(accessed 24 October 2016).
8 US Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, Treaty between the Government of the United States
of America and the Government of [Country] Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal
Protection of Investment, 2012, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/188371.pdf
(accessed 20 April 2016). See also Valerie H. Ruttenberg, ‘United States Bilateral Investment
Treaty Program: Variations on the Model’, 9 U. Pa. J. Int’l Bus. L. (1987): 121.
9 Ibid., p. 7.
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3. The third norm deals with the transferability of funds into and out
of the host country without delay according to the market rate of
exchange. This obligation is applicable on all transfers related to
‘covered investments’ and helps in the creation of a predictable
environment guided by market forces.10
4. The fourth norm puts a limit on the events or circumstances that
amount to impose restrictions on performance requirements. Such
restrictions were applicable to such specific circumstances that would
force covered investments to resort to inefficient and trade distorting
practices such as local content requirements or export quotas, in order
to predict an establishment, acquisition, expansion, management,
conduct or operation.11
5. The fifth norm of dispute settlement allows investors from both parties
the right to opt for international arbitration in the event of any
investment dispute with the host government. The norm also removes
the requirement to move the country’s domestic courts.12
6. The sixth norm gives covered investments the privilege to hire and
utilise the services of any top managerial official of their choice,
regardless of nationality in the arbitration.13
The following subsections scrutinise each of these norms in order to determine
their relevance to the domestic legal system and to find out how the allegations
and arbitration were dealt with under each norm.
A. US-BIT Norm of ‘National Treatment’ and ‘Most-Favoured Nation’
Under the norm of ‘National Treatment (NT)’ and ‘Most-Favoured Nation
(MFN)’, all investors and their ‘covered investments’ (investments in the territory
of the other party) enjoy a favourable treatment, akin to the manner in which
the host party treats its own investors and their investments or investors and
investments from any third country. Thus this BIT norm ensures NT or MFN
treatment during the whole life cycle of investment, i.e. from its establishment
or acquisition, through its management, operation and expansion, until its
disposition.
1. National Treatment Norm
There are many Egyptian investment laws that have granted this norm of National
Treatment to all foreign investors. To begin with, Article 6 of the Law of the
System of the Arab and Foreign Investment Capital and Free Zones (Law No.
43 of 1974) states that the capital that is invested in the Arab Republic of Egypt
10 Ibid., p. 9.
11 Ibid., p. 10.
12 Ibid., p. 26.
13 Ibid., p. 13.
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according to the provisions of this Law will have guarantees and benefits that are
stipulated in this Law, whatever the nationality of the owner of this capital or his
residence. The US Department of State points out that the Companies Law (Law
No. 159 of 1981) of Egypt governs domestic as well as foreign investments in
sectors that are not stipulated under the Investment Incentives Law. These sectors
are shareholders, joint stocks, limited liability companies, representative offices
and or branch offices. The law allows an automatic registration of the company
by presenting an application to the General Authority for Investment (GAFI),
with some exceptions.14 The Law also relaxed the legal requirement of having
at least 49 per cent of Egyptians as shareholders and also allowed 100 per cent
foreign representation on the board of directors in order to strengthen accounting
standards.15 Similarly, the Investment Incentives Law 8 of 1997 under its Article
12 grants 100 per cent foreign ownership for investment projects.16 In addition,
Article No. 37 states that ‘maritime transport projects established in free zones
shall also be exempted from the terms and conditions concerning the nationality
of the owner of the ship and its crew, as stipulated by the maritime Trade Code,
Law No. 84 of 1949 concerning the registration of merchant vessels’ in law No. 8
of 1997.17
The Egyptian capital market is governed by another Law, the Capital Markets
Law 95 of 1992,18 with all its amendments and regulations. The Law has
privileged all foreign investors to buy shares at the Egyptian Stock Exchange in the
same manner as do local investors.19 Additionally, the Prime Ministerial Decree
No. 548 for 2005 also removed restrictions on foreign property ownership.20 The
Insurance Law 156 of 1998 removed a 49 per cent ceiling on foreign ownership of
insurance companies, allowing privatisation of state-owned insurance companies
and abolishing a ban on foreign nationals serving as corporate officers.21 The
Electricity Law 18 of 1998 allows the government to sell minority shares of
14 US Department of State, Investment Climate Statement, Broad Overview of Investment Related
Laws May 2015. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/227163.pdf (accessed 3 April
2016).
15 Radwa S. Elsaman and Ahmed A. Alshorbagy, ‘Doing Business in Egypt After the January
Revolution: Capital Market and Investment Laws’, 11 (1) Rich. J. Global L. & Bus. (2011): 43.
16 Law No. 8 of 1997 (Law of Investment Guarantees and Incentives), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya,
11 May 1997 (Egypt). See GAFI, Law of Investment Guarantees and Incentives, www.gafi.
gov.eg/. . . /Laws. . . Regulations/. . . /Investment (accessed 19 October 2015).
17 Ibid., Article 37.
18 Shahira Abel Shahid, ‘Corporate Governance Is Becoming a Global Pursuit: What Can Be
Done in Egypt?’, 42 (2001) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=286875.
See also Law No. 95 of 1992 (Law of Capital Market), https://www.imolin.org/doc/amlid/Egypt/
Egypt_Capital_Market_Law_1992.pdf (accessed 8 May 2016).
19 US Department of State, Diplomacy in Action (June 2014), 5, at http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/227163.pdf (accessed 6 May 2016).
20 Ibid., 5.
21 Historical development of the insurance market in Egypt, Egyptian Financial Supervisory
Authority, at http://www.efsa.gov.eg/content/efsa_ar/eisa_pages/main_eisa_page.htm (accessed
6 May 2016). See also US Department of State, Diplomacy in Action (June 2014), 5, at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/227163.pdf (accessed 6 May 2016).
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electricity distribution companies to private shareholders, both domestic and
foreign. Noticeably, the Egyptian Electricity Law, issued by Law No. 87 for the
year 2015 represents the general legal framework for the electricity sector for
decades to come. The Electricity Law paved the way for a move from a state
monopoly to a free market for electricity.22
Likewise, Law No. 88 of 2003 provides that ‘Egyptians and others may own
the capital of banks, without being restricted by a maximum limit prescribed
in any other law, and without prejudice to the provisions of the following
Articles.’23 Prime Ministerial Decree No. 350 of 2007 further states that all
investment companies and their investors and their shareholders can own the land
and property required for conducting or expanding their businesses, irrespective
of the nationality or their residency or the percentage of their partnerships
and shareholdings.24 Finally, Maritime Law 1 of 1998 also mandates private
companies, including foreign investors, to conduct most maritime transport
activities, including loading, supplying and ship repairing.25
2. Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) Treatment
Most-Favoured Nation Treatment refers to a non-discriminatory trade policy that
shows one country’s commitment to giving equitable treatment to another on a
reciprocal basis. Under Article I of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) and its successor the World Trade Organisation (WTO), all signatory
states agreed to extend MFN treatment to one another. Common markets, customs
unions and free trade areas, however, were exempted from MFN provisions.26 The
MFN norm was included in Egyptian investment law by virtue of Presidential
Decree No. 27 of 1995 which allowed Egypt to join such international forums
as the WTO and the GATT. This Presidential Decree was passed by the People’s
Assembly of the Arab Republic of Egypt on 16 April of 1995 and was published
by the Official Gazette on 15 June 1995.27 The Presidential Decree enjoys the
22 Electricity and Renewable Energy Regulations in Egypt, p. 4, at http://www.riad-riad.com/
storage/app/media/Electricity%20and%20Renewable%20Energy%20Regulations%20in%20
Egypt-Website.pdf (accessed 21 April 2018).
23 Law No. 88 of 2003, at http://www.cbe.org.eg/NR/rdonlyres/19CACBC6-F058-4F6A-B075-
EFB17C6F418F/706/TheCentralBankTheBankingSectorandMoneyLawNo88for20.pdf (accessed
11 May 2016).
24 Gaber Mohamed Abdel Gawad and Venkata Sai Srinivasa Rao Muramalla, ‘Telecommunications
Revolution and Its Effects on Economic Development: An Applied Study of Developing
Economies Such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and India’, 1 (1) British Journal of Economics and
Sustainability Development (2014): 1–23.
25 OCED, National Treatment for Foreign-Controlled Enterprises, Egypt (2013): 36, at https://
www.oecd.org/investment/investment-policy/national-treatment-instrument-english.pdf
(accessed 7 May 2016).
26 Emily J. Blanchard, What Global Fragmentation Means for the WTO: Article XXIV, Behind-the-
Border Concessions, and a New Case for WTO Limits on Investment Incentives, Tuck School of
Business Working Paper 2439794 (2013).
27 Presidential Decree No. 27 of 1995, at https://eznaser.files.wordpress.com/2014/01/d983d8aad
8a7d8a8-d8a7d984d986d8b5d988d8b5-d8a7d984d983d8a7d985d984d8a9-d984d984d8acd8a7
d8aa.pdf (accessed 8 May 2016).
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power of law in accordance with Articles 108 and 112 of the Egyptian Constitution
of 197128 and the Constitution was in full force at the time of issuance of this
decree. The current Constitution of 2014 also recognises all such presidential
decrees having the power of law in Articles 151 and 156.29 That MFN was
given recognition by residential Decree is a clear indication that the Egyptian
lawmaker wishes to restore the Egyptian investment structure and is trying to offer
a legal framework to deal with foreign investors. The Decree and subsequent legal
agreements made it obvious that local investment laws of Egypt were capable of
achieving the norms of the international investment objectives.
The norms of National Treatment and Most-Favoured Nation Treatment have
contributed dynamically and vitally in the investor–state disputes in Egypt. Most
of the alleged breaches of these two norms come under the title ‘Fair and equitable
treatment/Minimum standard of treatment, including denial of justice claims’.
According to UNCTAD, the number of cases in which Egypt is respondent state
under these breaches is approximately twelve.30 These cases are listed in Table 1.
All these cases were appropriately pursued in the light of the BIT clauses in the
internal tribunal, the ICSID.
B. US-BIT Norm of Expropriation of Investments
Expropriation is understood as the act of confiscating privately owned property by
a government to be used for the benefit of the public.31After the 1952 revolution,
there were a few measures related to expropriation that were adopted in the
Egyptian legal structure.32 With the change in Egypt’s economic system and the
introduction of an open economy, Egyptian legislators opted to enforce first rules
of regularity with the international investment regime.33 Therefore it was made
clear in the provisions of the Investment Law that the norm of prevention of
nationalisation and expropriation of investment projects shall remain in force and
used for the public purpose.
28 Egypt’s Constitution of 1971, at http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/Egypt%20Constitution.pdf
(accessed 8 May 2016).
29 Egypt’s Constitution of 1971, at http://www.sis.gov.eg/Newvr/Dustor-en001.pdf (accessed 8 May
2016).
30 UNCTAD, Cases against Egypt, Investment Policy, at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/
ISDS/FilterByBreaches (accessed 29 April 2016).
31 R. Rajesh Babu, ‘Changing Trajectories of Investment Protection in India: An Analysis of
Compensation for Expropriation’, 6 (2) Trade L. & Dev. (2014): 359.
32 Dieter Weiss and Ulrich Wurzel, The Economics and Politics of Transition to an Open Market
Economy: Egypt (OECD, 1998).
33 John Waterbury, The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes
(Princeton University Press, 2014): 3–405.
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The Expropriation Norm was promulgated under Law No. 43 of 74. Articles 5
and Article 734 contain the details of this norm:
• Article 5 states that ‘expropriation will not be for real estate or
investment projects, but if such projects are deemed to be of public
interest, then the concerned law shall be applicable to it.’
• Article 7 states ‘under the expropriation norm that foreign projects
may not be nationalised or confiscated and would be dealt with
as per the law. Hence, the funds for these projects may not be
restrained, confiscated or placed under sequestration in a non-
judicial way.’35
After the issuance of Law No. 43 of 1974, two BITs were signed, one between
Egypt and France36 and the other between Egypt and United Kingdom,37 in
1974 and 1975 respectively. The Egypt-France treaty38 included the norm that
prevents the measurement of expropriation in Article 4 of the Law. The Article
states that neither of the contracting parties are entitled to take measures of
expropriation, nationalisation or dispossession, directly or indirectly, or against
investments of nationals or companies of the other Contracting Party except for
measures of expropriation which are provided for a public purpose and which are
neither discriminatory nor contrary to a specific undertaking.39 Similarly in the
Egypt-United Kingdom BIT,40 Article 5(1) states that ‘investments of nationals or
companies of either Contracting Party shall not be nationalised or expropriated or
subjected to such measures that might have effect equivalent to nationalisation or
expropriation.’41
Similarly, Articles 8 and 9 of the Investment Incentives Law (Law No.
8 of 1997)42 guarantees each contractual party that their investment projects
shall be neither nationalised nor confiscated but shall be treated under the law
34 Law No. 43 of 74, Articles 5 and 7, at http://ar.jurispedia.org/index.php/(eg) (accessed 21 April
2018).
35 Ibid., Article 7.
36 Egypt-France BIT, Investment Policy, UNCTAD, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/
Download/TreatyFile/1069 (accessed 10 October 2016).
37 Egypt-United Kingdom BIT, Investment Policy, United Nations, at http://investmentpolicyhub.
unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1122 (accessed 2 May 2016).
38 Egypt-France BIT, Investment Policy, United Nations, UNCTAD, at http://investmentpolicyhub.
unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1069 (accessed 9 May 2016).
39 Ibid., Article 4.
40 Egypt-United Kingdom BIT, Investment Policy, United Nations, at http://investmentpolicyhub.
unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1122 (accessed 2 May 2016).
41 Ibid.
42 The Investment Incentives Law (Law No. 8 of 1997), Law Concerning Incentives and
Guarantees, section 2, Investment Guarantees, Articles 8 and 9, at http://www.egypt-law.com/
Investments_law.pdf (accessed 10 May 2016).
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applicable. The law guarantees against full or partial expropriation of real estate
and investment projects.43 Specifically, each article states thus:
• Article 8 stipulates that ‘companies and establishments may not be
nationalised or confiscated.’44
• Article 9 states that ‘companies and establishments may neither
be sequestrated nor their assets be subject to administrative attach-
ment, nor seized, nor restrained, nor frozen, nor expropriated.’45
There are a few relevant allegations originating from issues related to
expropriation with Egypt as the responding party and a foreign company
as complainant. These cases are enlisted in Table 1. All these cases were
appropriately pursued in the light of the BIT clauses in the internal tribunal, the
ICSID.
C. US-BIT Norm of Free Transfers
Each individual and each business unit under Egyptian law is allowed to enter into
all kinds of foreign exchange transactions such as opening letters of credit (LC)
and accepting deposits.46 In the Egyptian legal system, the legal clauses related to
free transfers are stated as described below.
Article 111 of Law No. 88 of 2003 (Chapter 2: Regulating Foreign Exchange
Transactions) stipulates that ‘every natural or legal person can own or possess all
kinds of foreign currencies and enter into any kind of foreign currency transaction,
including inward and outward transfers, or perform local dealing as well, provided
that all such transactions are made via the banks authorised for dealing in foreign
currencies.’47 Notably, the law does not identify any nationality thus permitting
transactions without any restrictions.
Similarly, US Department of State reports48 cite that under the Investment
Incentives Law, non-Egyptian employees working on foreign investment projects
established under the law are permitted to transfer or repatriate their profits
abroad. The Law also permits conversion and transfer in cases where the
Investment Incentives Law had approved royalty payments in case of patents,
trademarks or any other licensing agreement.
Incidentally, the government has reiterated consistently its commitment to
encourage foreign investment in Egypt, for which it has agreed to a profit
43 US Department of State, Diplomacy in Action (June 2014): 8, at http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/227163.pdf (accessed 6 May 2016).
44 The Investment Incentives Law (Law No. 8 of 1997), Article 8, at http://www.investment.gov.eg/
content/EN/macro/investmentlawno8en.pdf (accessed 11 May 2016).
45 Ibid., Article 9.
46 US Department of State, Diplomacy in Action (June 2014): 7, at http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/227163.pdf (accessed 6 May 2016).
47 Chapter 2: Regulating Foreign Exchange Transactions, Article 111 of Law No. 88 of 2003, at
http://www.cbe.org.eg/NR/rdonlyres/19CACBC6-F058-4F6A-B075-EFB17C6F418F/706/
TheCentralBankTheBankingSectorandMoneyLawNo88for20.pdf (accessed 11 May 2016).
48 US Department of State, at https://careers.state.gov/learn/what-we-do (accessed 11 May 2016).
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repatriation system. Currently, for the purpose of profit repatriation, foreign firms
are required to open two separate bank accounts in their sub-custodian banks,
one for foreign currency and the other for local currency, in the name of their
foreign investors (global custodians). It must be ensured that these accounts are
exclusively maintained for stock exchange transactions only. The two accounts
thus create a channel for foreign investors to monitor their sales, purchases,
dividend collection and profit repatriation transactions in accordance with the
bank’s daily exchange rates in such a smooth manner that each transactions is
completed in less than two days.49
Explicitly, there does not exist any lawsuit against Egypt as a host state that
concerns transfers of funds. The majority of the breaches of the IIAs, particularly
BITs, that led to Egypt being sued are due to other BIT norms, though violation
of the free transfer of funds could potentially be one of the reasons to sue Egypt
under the prevalent conditions. For instance, after the January 2011 revolution,
certain restrictions were made on the conversion and transfers of funds out of
Egypt, with each individual not being able to transfer more than $10,000. As a
result, in January 2012, Egypt’s rating on a country’s transfer and convertibility
risk on a scale of 0 to 7, with 7 being the most risky, dropped to 5 and then to
6 in June 2013 from the rating of 4 that Egypt had maintained for many years.
Such ratings are scored in accordance with the OECD Arrangement on Officially
Supported Export Credits rates. Ostensibly, such a decline in the rating reflects
higher risks to the national economy and macroeconomic instability was due to an
unpredictable political transition.50 Hence, during this difficult time, it was quite
stressful to explore the possibility of suing Egypt for breaches of transfers of funds
in the international arbitration tribunals. However, no foreign investor decided in
favour of such allegations against Egypt.
D. US-BIT Norm of Performance Requirements
The Investment Incentives Law (Law No. 8 of 1997) in Egypt does not specify
any performance requirements or prerequisites to satisfy any local content
requirements and states that it is not necessary to seek approval to set up assembly
projects.51 Hence there are very few circumstances which necessitate imposing
performance requirements. Such circumstances are very specific and are said to
become eligible for such performance requirements in the case of investments
that resort to inefficient and trade distorting practices such as local content
49 US Department of State, Diplomacy in Action (June 2014): 8, at http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/227163.pdf (accessed 6 May 2016).
50 OECD Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits, 29 January 2016, at https://www.
oecd.org/tad/xcred/cre-crc-current-english.pdf (accessed 12 May 2016).
51 Egypt: Customs, Trade Regulations and Procedures Handbook, Volume 1 Strategic and Practical
Information (International Business Publications, 2013 annually): 46.
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requirements or export quotas to procure any kind of establishment, acquisition,
expansion, management, conduct or operation.52
Interestingly, Article 16 of Law No. 43 of 197253 stipulates that ‘an exemption
from performance requirements for eight years may be granted if it is in the
interest of the public, and such an exemption will depend upon the nature of
the project, size of its capital, its geographical location and its significance to
the economic development, contribution to the exploitation of natural resources
and increase of exports.’54
However, the Investment Incentives Law of Egypt (Law No. 8 of 1997)
does not specify any performance requirements.55 Article 10 though restricts any
administrative authority from intervening in or influencing investment projects in
any manner related to pricing their products or determining their profits. However,
Article 33 of the same Law allows all kinds of imports into the country from
the free zones under general import rules applicable to all kinds of imports and
makes payment of customs taxes mandatory on all imported goods from the
free zone into the local market. Since the products imported from free zone
projects comprise both domestic and foreign components, the customs tax, as the
law specifies, shall be on the base value of only the foreign components of the
imported goods and that too at the prevalent prices at the time of their egress from
the free zone into the country.
The Law also specifies that the customs tax due on the foreign components
shall not exceed the tax due on the final product imported from abroad. The foreign
components, for this purpose, are also defined as such imported foreign parts and
materials at the time of their ingress into the free zone, exclusive of the operating
costs in that zone. Similarly, the Law also states that ‘in order to determine freight
costs, the free zone shall be deemed to be the country of origin for the products
manufactured therein.’56 Thus the Law does not require any foreign investor to
fulfil any kind of local content requirements or a prerequisite for approval to set
up assembly projects.
Moreover, Article 6 of Decree 420 of 2000 allows for the reduction of customs
tariffs on intermediate goods if the final product has a certain percentage of input
from local manufacturers, beginning at 30 per cent of local content. However, the
decree states that, as the percentage of local content rises, so will the tariff reduce.
It should be noted here that the United Nations Commissions on International
Trade Law allows a minister to sanction tariff reductions up to 40 per cent in
advance to certain companies without waiting to reach a corresponding percentage
52 MENA-OECD Investment Programme, Business Climate Development Strategy, Phase 1
Policy Assessment, Egypt, Dimension I-1 Investment Policy and Promotion (June 2010),
https://www.oecd.org/globalrelations/47017849.pdf (accessed 13 May 2016).
53 Law No. 43 of 1972, Article 16, at http://www.arablegalportal.org/financial/legaldocs/investment/
egypt/AnnexNo.14.pdf (accessed 13 May 2016).
54 Ibid.
55 US Department of State, Diplomacy in Action (June 2014): 9, at http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/227163.pdf (accessed 6 May 2016).
56 Law No. 8 of 1997, Article 33, p. 18, at http://www.investment.gov.eg/content/EN/macro/
investmentlawno8en.pdf (accessed 13 May 2016).
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of local content. In addition, in 2010, Egypt also revised its export rebate system
to provide exporters with additional subsidies if they used a greater portion of
local raw materials.57
It should be mentioned here that manufacturers wishing to export under trade
agreements between Egypt and other countries are required to fulfil certificate
of origin and local content requirements contained therein. However, oil and gas
exploration concessions, which do not fall under the Investment Incentives Law,
do have performance standards, which are specified in each individual agreement
and which generally include the drilling of a specific number of wells in each
phase of the exploration period stipulated in the agreement. There are no formal
geographical restrictions on investments. However, due to congestion in Cairo,
the government has denied approval for investments in manufacturing facilities
in Cairo unless a compelling economic rationale exists. The government also
offered incentives to move existing manufacturing facilities out of Cairo. In cases
where investors have so requested, government officials have also assisted them
in identifying new sites for their projects, often in one of the new industrial sites
located outside Cairo, and sometimes also in providing necessary infrastructure.58
In addition to facilitating the relocation to new industrial sites outside Cairo,
the government also targeted Upper Egypt for development through private
investment. Land in industrial zones in Upper Egypt was offered free of cost. The
government also provided hook-ups to infrastructure (water, sewers, electricity
and gas) and transferred land title to the developer three years after the project
start-up. However, an approval by the security services was required for all such
investments, particularly in the Sinai Peninsula.59 In July 2007, Ministry of the
Interior (MOI) finalised procedures for granting usufruct rights (use by an investor
of a plot of land for a certain period of time to establish a project and profit
from it, after which both project and land are given to public ownership) in Sinai,
with the aim of boosting investment levels in the region. The procedures included
the facilitation of real estate registration, enabling the use of usufruct rights as
a guarantee for loans and enabling banks to register pledges on real estate and
foreclose in cases of non-payment.60
There are a few cases resulting from allegations highlighting performance
requirements in investor-Egypt disputes. These cases are listed in Table 1.
E. US-BIT Norm of Disputes Settlement
Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) is a forum for the resolution of disputes
between foreign investors and the state that hosts their investment. ISDS allows
foreign investors to initiate dispute settlement proceedings against a host state.
57 Investment Laws in Muslim Countries Handbook, Volume 1 Investment Laws, Regulations and
Opportunities in Selected Countries (International Business Publications, 2003): 110–28.
58 Egypt, supra, note 51.
59 The Executive Regulation to Implement Import and Export Law, at http://www.unesco.org/
culture/pdf/anti-piracy/Egypt/Eg_ExeRegulationIPCustoms_en.pdf (accessed 13 May 2016).
60 Egypt: Business Intelligence Report (International Business Publications, 2014): 53.
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Both the foreign investor and the host state must consent to ISDS regulations
before commencing any proceedings. Usually, the consent of the state is required
in international investment agreements between states. These agreements can
be bilateral (between two countries) or multilateral (between more than two
countries).61 In many cases, free trade agreements contain investment chapters
that provide for ISDS in the event of an investment-related dispute. There are
currently more than 2,700 international agreements lying pending with ISDS. The
requirement of consent to ISDS can also be found in the domestic investment laws
of some states and in specific contracts between a foreign investor and a state (or
a state-affiliated agency).62
Egypt acceded to the International Convention for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes in 197163 that was passed via Presidential Decree No. 90 of 1971. It
was published in the Official Gazette S. No. 45 on 11 November 1971.64Egypt
is a member of the ICSID, which provides a framework for the arbitration of
investment disputes between the host government and foreign investors from
another member state, provided that the parties agree to such arbitration.65 The
Egyptian courts do endorse international arbitration clauses; however, these are
confined to commercial contracts. For instance, on many occasions, the Court of
Cassation has given the verdict on the validity of arbitration clauses contained in
bilateral investment contracts between Egypt and a foreign party.66
Egypt has adhered to a few international agreements and treaties, namely the
New York Convention on the Enforcement of Arbitral Awards of 1958,67 the
Washington Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States
and the Nationals of Other States of 196568 and the Convention on the Settlement
of Investment Disputes between the Arab States and Nationals of Other States
61 John T. Schmidt, ‘Arbitration Under the Auspices of the International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID): Implications of the Decision on Jurisdiction in Alcoa Minerals of
Jamaica, Inc. v Government of Jamaica’, 17 Harv. Int’l. LJ (1976): 90. See also William S. Dodge,
‘Investor-State Dispute Settlement Between Developed Countries: Reflections on the Australia-
United States Free Trade Agreement’, 39 (1) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law (2006).
See also Andreas F. Lowenfeld, ‘Investment Agreements and International Law’, 42 Colum. J.
Transnat’l L. (2003): 123.
62 International Centre for Settlement Investment Disputes (ICSID), ‘What Is Investor-
State Dispute Settlement?’, at https://icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/about/Documents/
ICSID%20Fact%20Sheet%20-%20ENGLISH.pdf (accessed 3 October 2016).
63 P. F. Sutherland, ‘The World Bank Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes’, 28 (3)
International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1979): 367–400.
64 Presidential Decree No. 90 of 1971, at http://www.arablegalportal.org/financial/legaldocs/
investment/egypt/AnnexNo.15.pdf (accessed 14 May 2016).
65 Nassib G. Ziad, ‘ICSID’s Contribution to the Development of Investment Arbitration in the Arab
World’, 23 (2) ICSID Review (2008): 233–50.
66 Nigel Blackaby, Constantine Partasides et al., ‘An Overview of International Arbitration’, Redfern
and Hunter on International Arbitration (Oxford University Press, 2009).
67 A. J. Gemmell, ‘Commercial Arbitration in the Islamic Middle East’, 5 (1) Santa Clara Journal
of International Law (2015).
68 W. Zhu, ‘Arbitration as the Best Option for the Settlement of China-African Trade and Investment
Disputes’, 57 (1) Journal of African Law (2013): 149–63.
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of 197469 passed via Presidential Decree No. 1700 of 1974 and published in the
Official Gazette at S. No. 45 on 4 November 1976.70
The norm of settlement of investment disputes has given investors from both
parties the right to submit an investment dispute to international arbitration against
the treaty partner’s government in the event of any arbitration required. The
norm makes no provisions to use the country’s domestic courts.71 The Egyptian
legislators articulated this norm in Egypt’s investment laws under Article 8 of the
Law of the System of the Arab and Foreign Investment Capital and Free Zones
(Law No. 43 of 1974).72 These laws stipulate that all settlements of investment
disputes concerning the application of the provisions of this law must take place
in the manner that was agreed upon with the investor, or in accordance within the
framework of existing agreements between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the
state of the investor. Likewise, the Law also mandates its compliance even in part
settlement of investment disputes between the state and citizens of other countries
that had acceded to the Arab Republic of Egypt under the Convention Law No. 90
of 1971 on the conditions that apply to them. After the commencement of this law,
all BITs signed by Egypt have come under the jurisdiction of the above provision,
such as Egypt-UK BIT 197573 and Egypt-France BIT 1974.74
For the appointment of a panel for arbitration in case of any allegations, the
Law states that when a settlement of disputes is agreed upon by arbitration,
one arbitrator shall be appointed by each party initially and the two respective
arbitrators shall then appoint the third. If either party fails to appoint his arbitrator
within 30 days of a request to do so from the other party, or if the two appointed
arbitrators fail to agree on the third arbitrator within 30 days of the date of the
latest appointment between the two, the third arbitrator is selected by the decision
of the Supreme Council of Judicial Bodies. The arbitral tribunal thus may adopt
the arbitration procedures which it considers appropriate without being bound
by the rules of the Civil and Commercial Procedure Code, except those related
to the guarantees and the fundamental principles of litigation. It is also important
to put into account the time spent to resolve the dispute. The award of the arbitral
tribunal shall be determined by the majority after deliberations conducted in the
manner determined by the arbitral tribunal. This award shall be final, binding on
69 Fath El Rahman Abdalla El Sheikh, The Legal Regime of Foreign Private Investment in Sudan and
Saudi Arabia (Cambridge University Press, 2003): 384.
70 Presidential Decree No. 1700 of 1974, at http://www.arablegalportal.org/financial/legaldocs/
investment/egypt/AnnexNo.52.pdf (accessed 14 May 2016).
71 O. Thomas Johnson and Catherine H. Gibson, ‘The Objections of Developed and Developing
States to Investor-State Dispute Settlement, and What They Are Doing about Them’,
Contemporary Issues in International Arbitration and Mediation: The Fordham Papers 2013
(Brill, 2014): 251–69.
72 Law No. 43 of 1974, Article 8, at http://www.arablegalportal.org/financial/legaldocs/investment/
egypt/AnnexNo.14.pdf (accessed 15 May 2016).
73 Egypt-United Kingdom BIT, Investment Policy, United Nations, at http://investmentpolicyhub.
unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1122 (accessed 2 May 2016).
74 Egypt-France BIT, Investment Policy, United Nations, UNCTAD, at http://investmentpolicyhub.
unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1069 (accessed 9 May 2016).
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the parties and enforceable like final judgments. Finally, the arbitral tribunal shall
also identify who will bear the costs of arbitration.75
The Investment Incentives Law (Law No. 8 of 1997)76 recognises the right
of investors to settle disputes within the framework of bilateral agreements at
the ICSID or through arbitration before the Regional Centre for International
Commercial Arbitration in Cairo. The Law states that investment disputes
regarding the implementation of the provisions of this Law may be settled in the
manner agreed upon with the investor. The parties concerned may agree to settle
such disputes according to the terms and conditions of the treaties between the
Arab Republic of Egypt and the country of the concerned investor, or according
to the provisions of the Agreement on Settlement of Litigation in respect of
investments concerning one country and citizens of another country, to which
Egypt adhered by virtue of Law No. 90 of 1971, as applicable, or according to
the provisions of the Law No. 27 of 1994 concerning the Arbitration in Civil
and Commercial Matters. Last, but not the least, an agreement concerning the
settlement of such disputes and litigation may be reached by means of arbitration
before the Cairo Regional Centre for International Commercial Arbitration.77
Prior to the enactment of the Unified Investment Law No. 17 of 2015,78 there
existed two laws: (1) the Law of the System of the Arab and Foreign Investment
Capital and Free Zones (Law No. 43 of 1974); and (2) the Investment Incentives
Law (Law No. 8 of 1997) for granting foreign investors the right to overcome
the local remedies through local or international arbitration. Prior to the Unified
Investment Law No. 17 of 201579 came into force, in the early stages, both these
laws granted all foreign investors the right to overcome the local remedies through
means of local or international arbitration. Subsequently, the Unified Investment
Law No. 17 of 2015 has been issued to stimulate foreign investment in Egypt.
Besides, many provisions of investment laws such as the Law of Joint Stock
Companies, Partnerships Limited by Shares (Law No. 159 of 1981), the General
75 Law No. 43 of 1974, Article 8, at http://www.arablegalportal.org/financial/legaldocs/investment/
egypt/AnnexNo.14.pdf (accessed 15 May 2016).
76 Law No. 8 of 1997, at http://www.investment.gov.eg/content/EN/macro/investmentlawno8en.pdf
(accessed 15 May 2016).
77 Article 7, Law No. 8 of 1997, at http://www.investment.gov.eg/content/EN/macro/investment
lawno8en.pdf (accessed 15 May 2016).
78 The most important features of the Investment Law Executive Regulations, at http://www.
gafi.gov.eg/English/StartaBusiness/Laws-and-Regulations/PublishingImages/Pages/Business
Laws/The%20most%20important%20features%20of%20the%20Investment%20Law_2015.pdf
(accessed 4 October 2016). See also Law No. 17 of 2015, at http://www.gafi.gov.eg/English/
StartaBusiness/Laws-and-Regulations/PublishingImages/Pages/BusinessLaws/Investment%20
guarantees%20%20pursuant%20to%20the%20recent%20amendments%20by%20law%20No.17
%20of%202015.pdf (accessed 4 October 2016).
79 The most important features of the Investment Law Executive Regulations, at http://www.gafi.
gov.eg/English/StartaBusiness/Laws-and-Regulations/PublishingImages/Pages/BusinessLaws/
The%20most%20important%20features%20of%20the%20Investment%20Law_2015.pdf
(accessed 4 October 2016). See also Law No. 17 of 2015, at http://www.gafi.gov.eg/English/
StartaBusiness/Laws-and-Regulations/PublishingImages/Pages/BusinessLaws/Investment%20
guarantees%20%20pursuant%20to%20the%20recent%20amendments%20by%20law%20No.17
%20of%202015.pdf (accessed 4 October 2016).
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Sales Tax Law (Law No. 11 of 1991), the Investment Incentives Law (Law No. 8
of 1997) and the Income Tax Law No. 91 of 2005 have also been amended by the
Unified Investment Law No. 17 of 2015.80
Moreover, the norm relating to dispute settlement also refers to the right
to bring disputes to the appropriate panel based on procedural matters. It has
been observed that though the local investment laws adapted themselves to the
requirements of the international investment regime, the jurisdiction of traditional
national courts was avoided when considering investor-state disputes. This official
mechanism was one of the manifestations of state sovereignty; however, the
previous context refers to the adoption of Egyptian governments of the basic
norms of the BIT mode, particularly the American model in respect of the norm
of ‘Dispute and Settlement’ to be the mechanism for settling disputes between
Contracting Parties away from national courts. Logically, when the local judicial
system is surpassed, the attendance of Egypt before international arbitration
tribunals will be increased.
Records reveal that Egypt ranks third internationally as a respondent state.81
Hence the role of the Egyptian legislature has been articulated in promoting
the authorisation of international settlement, which means that it was at the
expense of the national court’s jurisdiction in investor-state disputes. Moreover,
Egyptian legislators also want to enact some kind of local legislation to agree
with the approach of international investment. But in truth it becomes clear that
the declared aim of this approach was to provide a judicial climate in which an
investor and a host state are on an equal footing.
The relevant allegation submitted before the ICSID under the norm of Disputes
Settlement are listed in Table 1.
F. US-BIT Norm of Senior Management and Boards of Directors
According to the BIT norm, an investor is free to appoint his senior management
and boards of directors. Since a major goal of the international investment
system is investor protection, this norm grants him the freedom to accomplish
the objectives set by the international investment system in order to provide
investment protection, equitable treatment and independence of foreign investors
and to develop a favourable investment climate. Additionally, all international
treaties on foreign investments, especially the American model of bilateral
treaties, prevent the host country from imposing conditions on the management
of investment projects. A few examples related to the prevention of conditions
imposed by the host country in investment project management can be cited.




81 Source: UNCTAD, ‘IIA Issues Note: Recent Trends in IIAS and ISDS’, No. 1 February
2015 database. Note: Preliminary data for 2014, at unctad.org/en/. . . /webdiaepcb2015d1_en.pdf
(accessed 11 October 2015).
Egyptian Investment Laws 471
First, neither party may require that an enterprise of that party having a covered
investment should appoint natural persons of any particular nationality to senior
management positions; second, neither party may require that a majority of the
board of directors, or any committee thereof, of an enterprise of that party that has
a covered investment, be of a particular nationality, or resident in the territory of
the party, provided that the requirement does not materially impair the ability of
the investor to exercise control over his investment.82
This norm grants investors the right to engage the top managerial personnel
of their choice, regardless of nationality. It is worth noting that the senior
management and boards of directors of the projects design the strategies of the
business in the project and take the necessary decisions. So it is clear that the
US legislators wanted to protect the investor and provide a favourable investment
climate for his investment, so they put this norm of ‘Senior Management and
Boards of Directors’ only to prevent the host state’s intervention. Thus the
protection of the investor and his investment was assured through this norm. This
norm was adopted by local Egyptian investment laws as follows:
• Article 10 of Law No. 43 of 1974 stipulates that the beneficiary
projects under this law will not be a subject to the provisions of
the Law No. 73 of 1973 which deals with the determination of the
conditions and procedures for election of the representatives of the
workers in management boards of the public sector units, joint-
stock companies, associations and private institutions. However,
the company will determine by its manner of working how the
workers will participate in the management of the project.83 This
Article represents a first step to mitigation of the intervention of
public sector rules in the regulations of the management structure
of investment firms.
• The contents of the above Article have been repeated in Article
36 of Law No. 8 of 1997 whereby it states that ‘companies
conducting their activities under the Free Zones Systems shall not
be subject to the provisions of Law No. 73/1973 which determine
the conditions and procedures of electing labour representatives to
the board of directors of public sector units, joint stock companies
and non-governmental organisations and private societies and
organisations.’84
• Law No. 159 of 198185 provides that ‘there should be no less than
three members for the incorporation, who must be the founders
82 Senior Management and Boards of Directors, US Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, 12, at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/188371.pdf (accessed 4 October 2016).
83 Article No. 10 of Law No. 43 of 1974, at http://www.arablegalportal.org/financial/legaldocs/
investment/egypt/AnnexNo.14.pdf (accessed 16 May 2016).
84 Article 36 in Law No. 8 of 1997. At http://www.investment.gov.eg/content/EN/macro/investment
lawno8en.pdf (accessed 16 May 2016).
85 On Joint Stock Companies, Partnerships Limited by Shares and Limited Liability Companies
as Amended by Laws Nos. 212/1994, 3/1998 and 159/1998, at.http://www.gafi.gov.eg/English/
StartaBusiness/Laws-and-Regulations/Documents/Lawno159oftheyear1981.pdf (accessed
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and/or shareholders, and that there should be no restriction on the
nationality of the founders. The company thus will contribute to
management by appointing the board of management. Similarly,
the board of directors must consist of at least three members of any
nationality.’
III. RELEVANT ALLEGATIONS AND VIOLATION OF US-BIT NORMS
There are allegations of Egypt violating the US-BIT norms, and therefore the
partner nation, finding itself an aggrieved party, has sued cases relating to
US-BIT norms before the arbitration forum, the ICSID. A list of the major cases
is been provided in Table 1; however, it is pertinent to discuss in brief here a few
of these cases to determine whether any violation has been made of the BIT norms
or whether the domestic laws were favoured in the interest of the people of Egypt.
To begin with, in the case Ahmonseto, Inc. and others v. Arab Republic of Egypt,
Case No. ARB/02/15, the claimants submitted that one of the banks, allegedly
controlled by Egypt, had made a few modifications in its credit policy, resulting
in the assessment of certain customs duties and taxes against the claimants.86 It is
possible that these amendments could have been made in the public interest, and
the law binds some exemptions and fee reductions with performance requirements
in order to encourage local content. This case reveals that when the state wishes
to comply with a BIT norm, it often conflicts with domestic policies and thus
a dispute is created. Under the BIT, a foreign investor always wants investment
privileges granted to him to not be modified, regardless of any conflict with the
economic policy or public interest of the host country. Therefore this case went
for an audience at an international arbitration tribunal to resolve this conflict. In
another case before the ICSID, La Union S.A. and Aridos Jativa S.L.U. v. Arab
Republic of Egypt, Case No. ARB/13/2, the cause of prosecution was the claims
arising out of the alleged overpricing by the Egyptian government of an operating
licence for a cement manufacturing plant, and the application of an allegedly
uncommon system of granting the licences through tenders.87 It was clear that the
Egyptian government had taken some measures that were deemed necessary for
the national requirements regarding the cement industry. These measures could be
categorised as performance requirements.
Likewise, there are instances where international arbitration tribunals have
asked the claimants to seek a redress from the local remedies. For instance, in
Case No. ARB/84/3,88 between Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited
4 October 2016). See also Law No. 159 of 1981, at http://www.investment.gov.eg/content/EN/
macro/Lawno159oftheyear1981En.pdf (accessed 16 May 2016).
86 Ahmonseto, Inc. and others v. Arab Republic of Egypt, Investment Policy, United Nations, at
UNCTAD, at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/97 (accessed 24 May 2016).
87 La Union S.A. and Aridos Jativa S.L.U. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, Investment Policy, United
Nations, UNCTAD, at http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/Details/540 (accessed 24 May
2016).
88 Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No.
ARB/84/3, http://www.italaw.com/cases/3300 (accessed 6 October 2016).
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and Southern Pacific Properties Limited (claimant), against the Arab Republic
of Egypt (respondent),89 the claimant presented its claim to the ICSID based
on Article 8 of Law No. 43 of 1974 that deals with the settlement of disputes
within the framework of the ICSID Convention. However, Egypt objects to the
jurisdiction of the ICSID, claiming that this jurisdiction does not apply to such
kinds of investment disputes and that it must be settled under local remedies or
through the domestic disputes settlement system. There are quite a few such cases
in which the arbitral tribunal made judgments related to jurisdiction and reverted
the case to the domestic courts for local remedies.
Significantly the Egyptian Investment Law has taken adequate measures to
protect the interests of the international investment regime, especially established
under BIT norms.90 This is evident from a number of cases that were submitted
before local tribunals. For instance there was a case filed in 2012 by the Egyptian
government before the Egyptian administrative court against an uneven and
unfair contract91 in a gas export deal between Egypt and Israel. The deal was
signed in 2005 and provided for Egypt to export 1.7 billion cubic litres of
natural gas annually for a period of 20 years. The price agreed upon in the deal
ranged between 70 cents and $1.5 for each million calories, despite its prime
cost of $2.65. A tax exemption was also granted additionally to the Israeli gas
company for three years from 2005 to 2008. Israel failed to pay the dues and the
indebtedness of the Egyptian Natural Gas Holding Company (EGAS) increased to
EGP 879 million ($123 million) by 2014.92 The First Instance Court cancelled the
contract of export of the Egyptian gas to Israel.93Along with this step, the Egyptian
legislators also redressed this intervention by the national court by means of Law
no. 32 of 2014 which dealt with forbidding any third party (outside the two main
entities constituting the investment contract – the state and investor) to challenge
contracts which the state concludes with any investor.94
These examples have at least proved one thing, that there is a need to involve
legislative controls at domestic levels in order to achieve a balance between the
89 Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID
Case No. ARB/84/3, p. 328, at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/
italaw6314_0.pdf (accessed 6 October 2016).
90 Ashraf M. A. Elfakharani and Rohana binti Abdul Rahman, ‘Significant Impacts on Egyptian
Legal System Caused by Egyptian Investment Legislation’, 4 (1) Humanities and Social Sciences
Letters (2016): 145–56.
91 ‘Egypt Cancels Israeli Gas Contract’, Guardian, Monday, 23 April 2012, at https://www.
theguardian.com/world/2012/apr/23/egypt-cancels-israeli-gas-contract (accessed 4 October
2016). See also Walid Khadduri, ‘Egyptian Gas Exports to Israel’, Al Arabia News, Monday, 21
February 2011, at https://www.alarabiya.net/views/2011/02/21/138539.html (accessed 4 October
2016). See also Seventh Day Newspaper published the text of the nullification suit on the rule of
exporting gas to Israel.
92 Mohamed Ibrahim, ‘Egypt pleads advocacy papers in international arbitration hearings in
exporting gas to Israel’, AlYoum7, 13 November 2014, at: https://www.youm7.com/story/2014/
11/13//1949869 (accessed 11 May 2015).
93 Guardian, ‘Egypt Cancels Israeli Gas Contract’, 23 April 2012, at: https://www.theguardian.
com/world/2012/apr/23/egypt-cancels-israeli-gas-contract (accessed 21 April 2018).
94 Articles 1 and 2, Law No. 32 of 2014, at http://www.globalarbitrationreview.com/cdn/files/gar/
articles/Translation_of_Law_No_32_of_2014.pdf (accessed 15 May 2016).
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national economic interest and the need for the foreign investor to reduce the
restrictions on his investment. Such cases, however, have also forced the Egyptian
legislators to investigate and make provisions in the existing law to prevent such
things happening again. Over the past two decades, the number of cases raised
by foreign investors against Egypt through international arbitration has increased,
particularly with the lack of transparency that has prevented the author of this
study from obtaining an exact number of cases raised against Egypt. Until now,
the number of known cases made against Egypt under BITs through the ICSID
(International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) is 25, with 13 cases
brought after the 2011 revolution. As a consequence, Egypt is facing monetary
demands that exceed 20 billion dollars per annum by foreign investors.95
IV. FIELD STUDY
In this connection, a survey was carried out which included respondents from
the Egyptian legislators, members of the arbitration council and a number of
independent lawyers and jurists. The respondents were asked whether there
existed any local mechanisms or local remedies that would satisfactorily address
the various investment disputes and whether they were strong enough to resolve
investment disputes related to BIT norms.
The first responder96 suggested that third parties should be prohibited from
questioning government treaties with investors. This was supported by the
argument that there has been a decrease in Egyptian investment arbitration
disputes because of this restriction. He argued that by prohibiting third-party
interference in state–investor contracts will also result in providing security and
stability to foreign investors conducting business with the state. He further added:
‘Recent years have witnessed increased third parties cases in courts to stop
privatization deals . . . of several former public companies [which] might not
seem attractive to foreign investors.’ The underlying strong assumption was that
Egyptian people have the right to supervise all types of international contracts. The
second, third and fourth responders had similar responses,97 commenting that ‘the
contracts between Egypt and foreign investors are based on a non-serious study;
moreover, the contracts created an imbalance between the parties of this contract.
In a few cases, foreign investors have been given favored treatment, but the public
interests must be protected to preserve the Egyptian natural entities.’ With regard
to the rest of the responders, who were the arbitrators,98 the fifth responders see
that this prohibition may reduce the claimants. However, they agreed that it would
not necessarily increase foreign investment in Egypt.
The sixth, seventh and eighth responders follow almost the same argument.
They contend that ‘this prohibition did not strengthen the position of Egypt
95 Supra, note 91.
96 The first responder is an academician.
97 The second, third and fourth responders are academicians.
98 The fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth responders are arbitrators.
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because the contracts and agreements are marred by many irregularities and
corruption. In any case, disputes will always arise inadvertently between foreign
investors and Egypt for many other reasons.’ The second, third and fourth
responders also added very useful information, stating that ‘the national courts
do not have the professional experts in the field of investment and BITs or
they have such individuals in the judicial cadres who have mastered the legal
texts of foreign languages. However, the Cairo Regional Centre for International
Commercial Arbitration could address such investment disputes.’ However, the
arbitrators’ responses seemed to suggest that ‘the means of domestic remedies
like the national courts or the Cairo Regional Centre for International Commercial
Arbitration are fully adequate to settle investor-Egypt disputes.’ However, there is
a contradiction since these responders have also pointed out that the utilisation of
local remedies would contravene the existence of foreign investment in Egypt. In
other words, local remedies tend to decrease foreign investment in Egypt.
When asked about their perception of the truth of this statement, that local
remedies really lower foreign investment in Egypt, the response of the arbitrators
was that ‘not the local remedies alone, there are many other factors that affect
investors’ decisions’. The second, third, fourth responders asserted that ‘foreign
investors actually look at the means of arbitration, which may accelerate the speed
of litigation, when required. Thus, investors focus on an appropriate equitable
judicial climate and not the local remedies to be an important criterion to reduce
the inflow of FDI to Egypt.’
A specific query was also made to the respondents relating to the compatibility
between local laws and the international investment regime norms, in order to
see whether granting legal privileges to foreign investors has strengthened the
presence of Egypt in international arbitration tribunals as a respondent state. The
first responder stated:
One must say that policy makers in Egypt are working on the
recovery of investment atmosphere in Egypt after years of political
and economic instability. This was evident in conducting a number
of economic reforms that involve, for instance, reducing energy
subsidies, devaluation of currency, and finally, application of value-
added tax. In terms of legal framework, policy makers are planning to
introduce a new company law, a new insurance law, and amendments
to bankruptcy proceedings and capital markets law.
The first responder strongly contended:
If I were an investor who would consider conducting business in
Egypt, I would not only think about privileges and incentives, but I
would look into all the previous factors as a whole. So in my opinion,
Egyptian investment arbitration disputes are partly connected with
the legal incentives and privileges I previously discussed. They are
also strongly related to a combination of economic and non-economic
factors that affect business in Egypt.
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He ended his argument by saying:
I think offering legal incentives to foreign investors might contribute
to the recovery of investment atmosphere in Egypt. Nevertheless, this
policy must be synchronized with other policies that tackle economic
and non-economic challenges in Egypt. In addition, although we
cannot ignore the importance of FDI in Egypt, we must not also ignore
the role of local investment in Egypt. There should be some sort of
balance when considering incentives between both local and foreign
investors.
The second, third and fourth responders have similar responses, arguing:
Although, the Egypt Government has put several relevant laws
recently that would encourage, motivate and attract foreign
investment through the provision of facilities represented in a one-
stop shop, however there is no significant increase in inflow of FDI.
In addition, the promotion of attendants of Egypt before international
tribunals will not decrease because of the lack of seriousness to amend
the basic deficiencies of investment structure in Egypt.
Ultimately, the arbitrators’ responders have given the following argument that
‘they do not think that this trend in the Egyptian government to adopt the
international investment norms will have a positive effect on Egypt’s position
as Respondent State.’ Moreover, its attendance before international arbitration
tribunals is still easy possible. Also, they added that the granting of legal privileges
does not provide any advantages in terms of the reduction of arbitration cases
against Egypt. Finally, they argued that the allegations against the Egyptian
government will increase due to these factors.
IV. CONCLUSION
The foregoing submission of facts in the form of cases therefore refers to the
fact that the Egyptian legislature has adopted the US Bilateral Investment Treaties
Model that contains six basic benefits, considered ‘core’ BIT norms. There is
evidence that Egypt’s investment laws reflect these global investment trends
and their legal requirements. With the adoption of BIT norms in the Egyptian
investment law structure, all Egyptian investment treaties along with their detailed
norms shall be now legitimised in the face of any legal objections, even if such
legal objections aim at protecting the public interest. Needless to say, the rules and
norms set up by the treaties also aim at restricting and regulating any untoward
behaviour that might obstruct the fulfilment of expectations of the members of the
regime or stand in conflict with the domestic legislation.
